

Abstract

The Otherness of Death: The Creative Translation of *Being and Time*

Dr. Danna Aduna
Instructor
Department of Philosophy, Ateneo de Manila University
Quezon City, Philippines
daduna@ateneo.edu

Abstract

1 Does Martin Heidegger's *Being and Time* recognize otherness, particularly the otherness and radical incomprehensibility of death? This paper explores, first, Heidegger's existential analysis of Dasein and his notion of the nonrelationality of death, which means that no one can take one's place in one's death. Reminding Dasein of the individual self lost within the they, and consequently, opening up the possibility for authenticity, death can be seen as an individuating experience in Heidegger's thought. Then, I explain Levinas's ensuing critique in *Time and the Other* that Heidegger's description of death depicts it as a primarily solitary phenomenon. Because death in Heidegger, in Levinas's view, encloses one within oneself, Heidegger's thought can be critiqued for excluding the sense in which one's own death is other (that is, fundamentally foreign) to oneself. Thus, in covering over the otherness of death, Heidegger does not account for how death ultimately opens one up to the Other human being. Next, I explore Derrida's position in the text *Aporias* that Heidegger's and Levinas's views on death are not necessarily incompatible. I argue that Derrida succeeds in defending this position by uncovering the sense of otherness in *Being and Time*. As this uncovering is made possible through Derrida's creative translation of a key sentence in *Being and Time* ('With death, Dasein stands before itself') into French, I conclude by exploring the possibilities of a creative translation of this sentence within the Filipino language.

In Good Measure: Heidegger and the Question of What is Proper to Us Humans

Dr. Remmon E. Barbaza

Associate Professor

Department of Philosophy, Ateneo de Manila University

Quezon City, Philippines

rbarbaza@ateneo.edu

Abstract

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In this talk I wish to discuss both the difficulty as well as the inescapability of the question of what is proper to us human beings, especially in terms of what we produce and what we consume. The question of doing or having “less” or “more” arises in different ways and different forms, such as the reduction of carbon emission, the call to simplicity of life, accumulating less of things and instead gaining more “experiences,” cutting down on work hours and adding more hours for leisure, “enhancing” our bodies with wearable or implantable technologies, or else avoiding them, or at least regulating them. All these ultimately and implicitly point to some basis according to which we human beings determine what is excessive or deficient, and what is “just right.” At what point are we able to say, “This is too much” or “We’ve gone too far”? I argue that we human beings should not use science and technology to simply (and naively) aim for what merely happens to be “faster, higher, stronger,” as the Olympics slogan goes, but must constantly engage in reflexive thinking, and see how we could possibly determine the measure according to which we can say that something is excessive or deficient. In this regard, Heidegger’s reflections on technology, *Gelassenheit*, and human dwelling remain to be ever important in addressing the question of what is proper to us as human beings.

Daoism and the German Mission in Martin Heidegger's *The Thing*

Mark Kevin S. Cabural, M.A.

PhD Student

Division of Humanities, The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology

Hong Kong

mkcabural@connect.ust.hk

Abstract

3 In this article, I examine Martin Heidegger's 1950 lecture/essay *The Thing* (Das Ding) in two ways. First, as a piece influenced by chapter 11 of the *Daodejing*. And second, as a postwar writing which can be interpreted vis-à-vis the *Black Notebooks* and his other writings. There are instances in *The Thing* which are analogous to his statements found in the *Black Notebooks* and his other writings which describe and clarify his controversial political affiliation. In brief, I suggest here that Heidegger's articulation of the concept of *wu* 無 of chapter 11 of the *Daodejing* as the void of the jug in *The Thing* may potentially describe his controversial engagement with German National Socialism as part of his response to the call for German mission. Notably, the fundamentality of the void of the jug is comparable to the exclusivity and exceptionality of the Germans in their mission; and the use of the void of the jug as outpouring is an interesting way to emphasize his disagreement with the regime by pointing out that his support to German National Socialism is not to the extent of brutally annihilating the Jews.

Keywords: Martin Heidegger, Daodejing, German mission, Nothing, Void, Emptiness

Labor as the Foundation of Knowledge by Scheler and Heidegger

Dr. Peter Ha
Professor

Graduate School of Physical Education, Kyung-Hee University
Seoul, Korea

peterha61@hanmail.net

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Abstract

The objective of this paper is that by relating Heidegger's thoughts with M. Scheler's sociology of knowledge we seek to unveil a new foundation of knowledge based on labor. In the first part, we will deal with explaining Scheler's sociology of knowledge and its relation to labor. In the sociology of knowledge, Scheler, who has converted from a phenomenologist to a Marxist, argues that the knowledge of thing is founded not only in the 'thinking ego' but also in the social structure. Furthermore, he advocates that in order to know an object, there is required not only an act of understanding as intellectualism insists but also the practical activity, namely, the activity of labor. In the second part, we will attend to clarifying the practical comportment of Dasein in respect to labor. We will attempt to interpret the practical activity of Dasein, which is derived from the action of hand as labor. Hence just like Scheler, for Heidegger, who also advocates that the practical activity precedes the theoretical thinking, Dasein is defined as *homo laborans* from which the knowledge of thing is derived.

Heidegger's Expression of "Founding a Political State" and the U. S. Constitution

Dr. Choong-Su HAN

Assistant Professor

Department of Philosophy, Ewha Womans University

Seoul, Korea

choong-su.han@ewha.ac.kr

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Abstract

In the essay *The Origin of the Work of Art*, Heidegger enumerates five ways in which truth occurs. However, his discussion only includes the first way (art) and the last way (the thinker's questioning), leaving the other three ways (founding a political state, the nearness and the essential sacrifice) unexplained. This paper gives an account of what Heidegger means by the foundation of a political state. In the second chapter of this paper, I demonstrate that the state of the politician corresponds to the work of the artist and the state is the work for all other works. In the third chapter, my demonstration is supported by Heidegger's understanding of the Greek state (πόλις). In the last chapter, I examine whether the U. S. Constitution can be a relevant example of the foundation of a political state in the sense of Heidegger.

Heidegger and Chinese sources: between Orientalism and Occidentalism

Dr. Jean-Yves Heurtebise

Assistant Professor

Department of French Language and Culture, Fu Jen Catholic University

New Taipei City, Taiwan

jy.heurtebise@gmail.com

Abstract

6 Though Heidegger as became a kind of conceptual companion of comparative philosophers and a methodological example for interpreters of Taoist philosophy claiming that Zhuangzi or Laozi embodied the overcoming of Western “onto-theology”, Heidegger himself not only stressed his disbelief in the notion that Asian thinking could save the West from its “civilizational crisis” but claimed clearly that Western thinking could emerge only by its distinction from the “mythical East”. However, at the same time, Heidegger criticized the decadence of the West, claimed the necessity of cultural rejuvenation and then, with the failure of Germany to perform this task, seemed to have turn to Chinese sources to find alternative solutions. How to understand Heidegger’s complex relation to China? Is Heidegger an Orientalist or an Occidentalist European philosopher? Moreover, how to understand the subtle and troubling connections between Heidegger’s complex relation to China and Heidegger’s highly “problematic” (to say the least) intellectual engagement with the Nazi ideology? To what extent Orientalism and Occidentalism are linked to Heidegger’s belief in nationalist-socialists’ claims to “save” the “European spirit”?

Being Ready for Withdrawal: Heideggerian Authenticity and Its Structural Similarity to Christian Faith

Dr. Yasuaki Kimijima
Assistant Professor
Department of Philosophy, Hosei University
Tokyo, Japan
yasuakikimijima@gmail.com

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to uncover the essential feature of Heidegger's concept of "authenticity" (Eigentlichkeit) as it appears in *Being and Time*, and to point out its structural similarity to Christian faith as he understands it.

To begin with, I will roughly characterize the Heideggerian authenticity, and then take up two previous interpretations, one of which is so-called "expressivist" view, famously represented by Charles Guignon, and the other is Denis McManus's recent interpretation.

7 According to McManus, a person who is authentic in Heidegger's sense is reasonably led to "all-things-considered judgment" of their situation. This is because whenever they choose to do something, they are pushed to meet multiple demands of their situation, but they must leave some of them unmet. Heidegger calls this falling short a kind of "nullity" (Nichtigkeit), and suggests that the authentic person is motivated by this nullity. Thus, in this regard, McManus's interpretation seems fairly plausible.

However, this alone cannot suffice being authentic, and that is why Heidegger refers to another concept of nullity, which McManus explicitly omits in his paper. In my reading, this another nullity comes from the fact that whenever I choose to do something, the options to choose from is narrowed down in the first place as a result of my being-this-particular-me. Now, if the authentic person is also motivated by this another nullity, then it seems plausible that they try *not* to be satisfied with their own judgment on what to do, but rather to be always ready for withdrawal of such a judgment, and wait for an occasion to catch up with those possibilities that are excluded in the first place due to my being-this-me and so remain unknown to me.

If that is the case, it seems that Heideggerian authenticity, thus understood, has a structural similarity to Christian faith, which I think is best captured by Luther's words: "Faith means surrendering oneself to matters that cannot be seen." By way of conclusion, I would like to point out this similarity and briefly ponder its meaning.

Heidegger's Interpretation of Logos in GA33

Dr. Ka-wing Leung
Professor, Department of Philosophy
Director, Center for Phenomenology
Associate Director, Academy of European Cultures
Tongji University
Shanghai, China
leung_kawing@hotmail.com

8

Abstract

The Greek word logos is almost untranslatable. Heidegger attempted to interpret it in several different ways throughout his long career. The interpretation he offers in GA33 is quite unique. He translates logos with Kundschaft and thus opens up the question of whether animals other than human beings are also logon echon.

**The Priority and Meaning of Life and Death
-- The Views of Confucius and Heidegger**

Dr. Shing-Shang Lin
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy, Tunghai University
Taichung, Taiwan
sophialinde@thu.edu.tw

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Abstract

When Ji-Lu (季路) asked about death, Confucius answered his student: “How can we know death, before we get acquainted with life?” (未知生，焉知死?) Because of this answer, it has always been known that for Confucius as well as Confucianism life has priority over death. At first glance, Confucius’ views about priority of life over death are different to Heidegger’s. But Confucianism respects death and the dead. They follow traditional Etiquette and Ceremonial, namely received from Zhou Dynasty, and give the dead an elaborate and rich funeral. This paper tries to explore the priority of life over death by Confucius and comparing to Heidegger. In this way, it will try to understand Confucius’ view of life and death, especially of death, with Heidegger’s phenomenology and Hermeneutics.

Keywords: Heidegger, Confucius, Death

Heidegger and the Aesthetics of Everyday World

Dr. Chon Ip Ng

Associate Professor

Interdisciplinary Program of Humanities and Social Sciences

Graduate Institute of Philosophy, National Tsing Hua University

Hsinchu City, Taiwan

cing@mx.nthu.edu.tw

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Abstract

Heidegger's analysis of the everydayness in *Being and Time* is one of the classical phenomenological analysis. And as to every classical piece of philosophy, it is at the same time paradigmatic and controversial, and provides the referential framework of many later attempts to a phenomenological understanding of the original mode of human existence.

In this paper, I would like to reexamine Heidegger's approach to everyday sensibility and its limits. By drawing insights from other phenomenological thinkers, especially that from Levinas and Merleau-Ponty, I would critically explore the possibility to developing an aesthetics of everyday world in contrast to Heidegger.

Heidegger on “Gelassenheit” and our Encounter with Things

Dr. Mathias Obert

Professor

Institute of Philosophy, National Sun Yat-sen University

Kaohsiung, Taiwan

sounhao@faculty.nsysu.edu.tw

Abstract

11 This paper draws its general inspiration from the book *Zhuang Zi* 莊子 and ancient Chinese texts on the art of writing, in combination with late Heideggerian thought. It mainly analyzes Martin Heidegger’s reflections on “Lassen” and “Gelassenheit”, i.e. “letting” and “yieldingness”. This is to show how man’s existence as timeliness and movement is “eingelassen” or “embedded in” the world. As such existence should “yield” to itself, as well as to things, in a responsive manner, instead of “acting out” what is pretended to be an essence, also instead of “acting on” things of the world. These reflections shed new light on the European discourse on “reification”, put forward anew by the Frankfurt School, most recently. With respect to this background, the paper tries to take advantage of Heidegger’s thought, in order to disclose a different way of looking upon and dealing with things. Problems of artistic reification, especially the status of things in Japanese gardens, will be discussed as concrete testimony to the general thesis that we ought to take a “yielding” attitude, regarding things, so as to “let” things come forward and “let” ourselves exist in an encounter with things, if we want to keep our relation to the world replete with sense.

Keywords: letting, Gelassenheit, reification, art, Japanese gardens

Methodical Consideration for Fundamental Ontology: Based on the Ideas of Authenticity, Hermeneutic Repetition and Being-with-others

Dr. Min Seol

Department of Ethics Education, Pusan National University

Pusan, Korea

mmmiinnn@gmail.com

Abstract

One of the commonalities of the philosophers who decorated the history of philosophy may be that each of them devised their way of developing philosophical thinking. Some examples include Socrates' Elenchus, Descartes' *Rules for the Direction of the Mind*, Kant's transcendental deduction, Hegel's dialectic, and Husserl's phenomenological reduction. These are the way to the truth, the μέθοδος. Of course, they also might have used general procedures to gain knowledge, such as logical deductions, inductive generalizations, or proof by empirical evidence. But the crucial part of their philosophy was obtained by their unique method. They opened up the possibility of a new philosophy by devising new methods.

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For a philosopher to suggest a method as a way to the truth, and even the truth that has not been revealed before, however, he or she must also justify the method itself. Then, it must be convincingly shown how it can be a process of attaining truth, not untruth. Some philosophy takes on the special challenge of this methodical justification. And the success of its inquiry depends largely on the success of this justification.

In my opinion, early Heidegger also devised his particular way for his philosophical thinking. It is hermeneutics. The fundamental ontology developed in *Being and Time* is the result of phenomenological exploration according to the hermeneutic method. Thus, fundamental ontology owes its legitimacy to hermeneutics. Then, how can hermeneutics be justified again? How does Heidegger meet the challenge of methodical justification for fundamental ontology? Does he meet it properly? Indeed, one can find out much "genuinely methodical consideration" in *Being and Time*. As we will see later, however, some researchers see Heidegger failing to meet the challenge.

My interest in this presentation is to consider how hermeneutics is developed as a path to the truth presented in *Being and Time* and to what extent it can be justified or allow legitimacy for fundamental ontology. To this end, I will examine in order what (1) authenticity, (2) hermeneutic repetition, and (3) being-with-others can contribute to methodical consideration.

From the East or the West?—The Sources of Heidegger's Philosophy

Dr. Sun, Yun-Ping
Professor

Graduate Institute of Philosophy, National Central University
Taoyuan, Taiwan

bunyansun@yahoo.com

Abstract

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It is said that Heidegger's philosophy was to some extent inspired by Asian philosophies, especially by Chinese or Japanese one. It was described how Heidegger had in contact with some Japanese scholars or was interested in Daoism or Buddhism. What have been done in this way is actually at most to show the affinity between Heidegger's thought and the way of Asiatic thinking. That is also the reason why so many Asian scholars find sympathetic with Heidegger and are attracted by his philosophy. Yet to infer that Heidegger's thought be influenced by Asian thinkers is an exaggeration. I think it is not the case. In fact, Heidegger was deeply immersed and rooted in his own Western religious and philosophical tradition. His philosophy, especially his idea of Being and Nothing, could be traced back to the Mysticism of the Middle Age, not only Master Eckhart (1260-1328), but also Nicolas of Cusa (1401-1464). This paper intends to identify the real sources of Heidegger's philosophy and contend that Heidegger's fundamental ontology is a "secular" version of German Mysticism. Heidegger received and transformed Eckhart's idea of God and Nicolas of Cusa's idea of the Absolute into his own idea of Being. This essay will show the connection between them and then in what sense Heidegger's conception of Being is related to Asiatic thinking.

A People in Authentic Understanding

Yuka Suzuki, M.A.
PhD Student
Graduate School of Letters, Keio University
Tokyo, Japan
yuuka.suzuki@gmail.com

Abstract

What is a people in authentic state? How does Dasein become authentically bound together? Such ontical-existential questions easily arise in the reading of *Sein und Zeit*. Readers naturally want concrete and practical examples because Heidegger defines authenticity as an ontological-existential concept whose root is ontical-existential. If it were not for practical and pre-ontological life, philosophical research would carry no weight.

14 In this paper, I will approach these questions regarding a people in authentic state, which Heidegger does not elaborate himself. In response to the first one, a people in authentic state, it will be suggested, should be grasped by focusing on authentic understanding. Some researchers apply the dichotomy authentic/ inauthentic not only to understanding of Dasein's ownmost possibility but also to the way of using equipment or solicitude. However, according to Heidegger, only understanding of such possibility can be termed authentic or inauthentic. This interpretation enables us to conclude that understanding a people in an authentic way is to agree to thrownness of Dasein forcefully.

In response to the second question, by being showed or told experience of the collapse of familiarity, Dasein can become authentically bound together. Of course, Dasein which is showed another Dasein's crucial experience does not always become such state. However, there is room for encouraging another Dasein to face its ownmost possibility which includes ownmost thrownness because Dasein can be given back 'care' by another Dasein. In my opinion, to become authentically bound together means not to become more friendly or to build up a good relationship, but for each Dasein to understand ownmost possibility and thrownness authentically and tell another Dasein how anxiety appears.

Through this paper, we will realize that a people in authentic understanding embodies a particular thrownness and helps another Dasein feel anxious.

Forgetfulness of the Paradoxical? Heidegger, the Presocratics and Daoism

Dr. Fabian Heubel
Research Fellow
Institute of Chinese Literature and Philosophy, Academia Sinica
Taipei, Taiwan
heubel@gate.sinica.edu.tw

Abstract

15 Martin Heidegger's encounters with Chinese philosophy repeatedly lead to painful questions that force us to pause and think. Thereby, and perhaps only thereby, the contemporary significance of Chinese philosophy in the West can be proven, and the "inevitable conversation with the East Asian world" (GA 7, 41) can take its course: as paradoxical communication. Heidegger has opened up a transcultural dynamic of the old and the new, of East and West, which is very promising. However, by the very circumstances of its emergence in Heidegger's thinking about the pre-Socratics and Daoism in the 1940s, it is inextricably linked with the admonition to caution. Moreover, this communication between pre-Socratic and Daoist thinking, born out of crisis and afflicted with historical catastrophe, damaged from the beginning and pathologically distorted, is a sign in which the impossibility of following the traces left behind by Heidegger is expressed. But perhaps this is precisely the problem: on the one hand it seems impossible to continue Heidegger's way to the East, but on the other there is no way that can bypass his.

From Anxiety to Anxieties

Dr. Wei-Ding Tsai
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy, National Chengchi University
Taipei, Taiwan
sprache@nccu.edu.tw

Abstract

Heidegger talks about Dasein's anxiety (Angst) in *Being and Time* and points out that anxiety is different from fear (Furcht), because it doesn't refer any objects. When Dasein feels anxious, it is anxious about its not being anymore (its death), rather than at any particular beings. Besides, Heidegger argues that anxiety can motivate Dasein to be aware of and to decide its own being, not to be given to everyday beings, and then to change its mode of being from inauthenticity to authenticity. Since Heidegger's general analysis of anxiety is for an ontological purpose and only used methodologically to justify that Dasein can really grasp the whole structure of its being by means of anxiety, he is not interested in specifying different types of anxiety (Ängste) from the anthropological perspective. Nevertheless, Gadamer claims in his book *The Enigma of Health* that we can follow Heidegger's analysis of anxiety and try to explore how the anxiety about Being (Sein) does develop into an anxiety at a being (Seiendes), and even worse into an illness. According to Gadamer, illness results from the situation that the nature of our body and mind loses its balance. Hence, when anxiety makes Dasein lose balance, it may have an anxiety disorder and thus is regarded as ill. Because Gadamer doesn't systematically elaborate on how this will happen, this article intends to supplement it further with Irvin Yalom's theory of existential psychotherapy.

Keywords: anxiety, death, anxieties / anxiety disorder, Heidegger, Gadamer, Yalom, existential psychotherapy

To understand Heidegger via Ricoeur

Dr. Wen-Sheng Wang
Professor

Department of Philosophy, National Chengchi University
Taipei, Taiwan

wswang@nccu.edu.tw

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Abstract

We can directly interpret Heidegger's philosophy. We can also understand Heidegger's philosophy from his successors. The potentially significant thinking of a forwarder can be found out by the creative thinking of his successor. In this article, I want actually to discover and extend the greatness of Heidegger's thinking from Ricoeur's thinking. This is not a historical, but rather a problematic approach. For I will not work intensively how and what Ricoeur told us that he has succeeded Heidegger. Rather I attempt to find the relationship of Ricoeur to Heidegger with regard to certain philosophical issues. My focus points are as follows: history, narrative time, and action.

The Idea of Thing and Ethicality of Zhuangzi and Heidegger, from the perspective of *Ereignis*

Dr. Wan-I Yang
Associate Professor

Institute of Philosophy, National Sun Yat-Sen University, Taiwan

wiyang0905@hotmail.com

Abstract

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This essay attempts to discuss the relation between Zhuangzi and Heidegger from the perspective of the “great usefulness of uselessness” and the “thinging (transformation) of things”. But why we chose to carry out the issue from this dimension? In addition to the idea of “great use of worthless tree” from the chapter entitled *In the world of Men* in *Zhuangzi* as well as the article written by Heidegger in 1945 entitled *Evening Conversation: In a Prisoner of War Camp in Russia, between a Younger and an Older Man*, we are also influenced by the articulation of the Thing (*Ding*) from the *Ereignis* in the work entitled *Heidegger and Christianity: Silent explication (Heidegger et le Christianisme : l'explication silencieuse)* written by Didier Franck. In addition to connecting the signification of “transformation of things” with Heideggerian interpretation of the “thing” (*Ding*) summarized by Didier Franck, this essay also attempts to connect Zhuangzi with Heidegger, regarding their discussion of uselessness and their relation between the uselessness and the “thinging (transformation) of the Thing. Accordingly, this essay also intends to respond to the “uprooting” problem of modernity, and thus to bring out the ethicality of Zhuangzi and Heidegger.